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MONEY AND JUSTICE: WHO OWNS THE COURTS? By Lois G. Farer. 
New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1984. Pp. xi, 244. $16.95. 
In Money and Justice, Lois G. Forer1 explains that she "does not 
purport to discuss theories of fairness, equality, or justice" (p. 223 
n.24). But precisely these notions, and most particularly the idea of 
fairness, underlie Judge Forer's treatment of unequal access to the 
courts. Whether framed in terms of due process or equal protection of 
the law, fairness is the issue here. As a former President noted, life 
isn't fair. Some people are wealthy, many are not. Corporations have 
extensive resources and power, most individuals do not. The question 
is whether society can live with a legal system that, often with fright-
ening accuracy, mirrors the unfairness of the social structure. Forer 
maintains that it cannot. 
Money and Justice presents the thesis that "American courts are 
not equally open and available to all who have legal claims and de-
fenses - that there is turnstile justice for the poor and lengthy trials 
and appeals for those who can afford to pay for lawyers, investigations, 
expert witnesses, and documentary and physical evidence" (p. 14). 
Because of this disparity in trial time and quality of representation, the 
author concludes that most poor people do not receive due process in 
either civil or criminal courts. This problem of varying standards of 
justice based on economic status has, of course, been discussed before. 2 
Forer adds to the subject her perspective as a trial judge in a state 
court, where she witnessed, first-hand, inequities in the application of 
law. 
Forer's examination of unequal justice focuses on the bifurcated 
legal system. There is, in law, what she calls a two-track system: a 
fast-track composed of lawyers who are highly intelligent graduates of 
top law schools and who inevitably end up in large corporate firms, 
and a slow-track composed of lawyers who have less impressive cre-
dentials and who tend to be mediocre, even incompetent. Fast-track 
lawyers never see the poor; slow-track lawyers represent the poor, but 
often do a bad job of it (pp. 57-66). Lawyers, however, as well as their 
clients, are victims of "the system" (p. 73). Law schools are popping 
up like dandelions; deficient curricula and faculty, along with low ad-
1. Lois G. Forer is a judge of the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia. Before ascending 
the bench in 1971, she practiced Jaw for thirty-two years; eight of those years were spent as 
Deputy Attorney General for Pennsylvania. She is also the author of CRIMINALS AND VICTIMS 
(1980); THE DEATH OF THE LAW (1975); and "No ONE WILL LISSEN": How OUR LEGAL 
SYSTEM BRUTALIZES THE YOUTHFUL POOR (1970). 
2. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE (M. Cappelletti & B. Garth eds. 1978); J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL 
JUSTICE: LA WYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976); H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA: CoURTS, LAWYERS, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 73-75 (4th ed. 1984), 
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mission standards, have caused the legal profession to be overwhelmed 
by the "rising tide of mediocrity" in American education (p. 65). 
The two-track system is evident in the judiciary as well. The fed-
eral bench gets fast-track lawyers. Slow-track lawyers drift to the 
state courts, where those issues most affecting the poor (employment, 
marriage, property, safety, family) are at least initially decided. (pp. 
74-75). The level of competence of the federal bench is high. State 
judges have not met this standard; while many state judges serve qui-
etly and well, others are corrupt, incompetent, and arbitrary. "They 
have frequently refused to enforce the law and permitted delays, 
backlogs, and hasty procedures that deny litigants any semblance of 
due process of law" (p. 82). Forer suggests that the reasons for the 
disparity between federal and state judges are the selection process 
(usually politicized at the state level), working conditions, salaries, and 
prestige (p. 82). Those state judges who manage to persevere, to re-
main honest, and to mete out concerned justice, find their rewards 
predominantly in the self-satisfaction of the job well done and in the 
appreciation occasionally expressed by those who come before the 
court (p. 90). 
Indigent litigants are further hampered by the expense of the trial 
process. Delays in hearings, court fees, and costs incurred from 
missed work, carfare, and child care, often force low-income individu-
als to forgo enforcement of their legal rights or to submit to unsatisfac-
tory settlements. Delayed criminal hearings may prejudice an 
accused's defense. (pp. 111-16). Indigent defendants, unable to raise 
bail, cannot afford private investigators and expert witnesses. Juxta-
posed against this situation is the wealthy defendant, with high-pow-
ered lawyers and litigation ~cience firms plotting his defense, whose 
lengthy jury trial takes valuable court time away from victims of turn-
stile justice. 
The two-track legal system and the disparity in resources haunt 
the appellate process as well. Forer views the right to seek review of 
trial court decisions as essential (p. 151). Because of inadequate pres-
entation of their claims and defenses, poor litigants are subjected to a 
greater probability of error and unjust results at trial (p. 152). How-
ever, despite the convicted person's right to representation by counsel 
at public expense in taking an appeal, the trial record in a badly tried 
case can make it impossible to get a fair appellate hearing (p. 158). 
Moreover, poor defendants, considering their situations hopeless, 
often fail to appeal (p. 158). Indigent civil litigants cannot wait several 
years to collect damages for their injuries; even the threat of appeal 
may lead them to settle for what they can get (pp. 153-55). 
The author offers several proposals to begin to whittle away the 
two-tiered approach to justice in the American legal system (pp. 203-
17). The first step is to shorten unduly long trials. Judges should 
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schedule one major trial every two or three days, and defer those cases 
that cannot meet this schedule (p. 205). Additionally, court access 
fees, which only minimally reimburse the public for the costs of trials, 
should be abolished. Rather, costs which actually reimburse the 
courts should be imposed at the discretion of the judge, taking into 
account trial time, the frivolous or substantial nature of the claim or 
defense, delaying tactics, the amount in issue, and the ability of the 
parties to pay (p. 206). 
Porer also suggests that "[f]ree counsel should . . . be provided 
for indigents in civil cases that involve substantial rights" (p. 206), and 
that litigants should be allowed to select their own counsel from a list 
of qualified attorneys (p. 207). "[N]ew qualifications for eligibility to 
take ... bar examination[s] would eliminate the most egregiously in-
ept lawyers," and minimum standards of eligibility to the bench 
should be established by law (p. 211). Appeals could be simplified by 
limiting hearings to consideration oflegal issues, rather than bothering 
with the often anomalous facts of a case (p. 212). Issues should be 
decided once and for all, without devising tests, classifications of 
rights, and varying levels of review which allow manipulation of the 
law in response to shifting public opinion. Finally, Porer suggests in-
formal exchange of ideas between courts and disciplines other than 
law, and the establishment of a National Center for Legal Research to 
study problems of equal access to justice (p. 216). 
Porer admits that these suggestions may result in a "leveling 
qown" rather than a "leveling up," but contends that substantial due 
process rights would not be denied any party (p. 217). She finds that 
modern theories of alternative dispute resolution are unsatisfactory 
remedies because they would deny the poor access to the courts.3 In-
creasing the number of judges is also inadequate because it would 
lower judicial prestige and lead to anarchy in decision making (pp. 
191-93). 
Money and Justice is most thought-provoking when it offers the 
reflections of an angry and disillusioned trial judge who has come to 
regard the progress made in individual rights in the 1960's as a cruel 
hoax for indigent litigants seeking the protections of due process (p. 
110). Perhaps a more carefully drawn picture of this individual expe-
rience would have a more profound impact on the reader. As the book 
is written, however, a reader may resist the sweeping two-tiered classi-
fications the author makes: competent and incompetent lawyers; hon-
est and corrupt judges; ignorant, helpless poor and crafty, powerful 
3. The thrust of the popular panaceas is to deny access to the courts for a wide variety of 
problems. Under the proposals the bulk of the cases that would be diverted from the courts 
involve poor people. . • . [I]n operation they would institutionalize two separate and un-
equal systems of justice: courts of law with rights and constitutional safeguards for the rich 
and speedy extralegal forums for the poor. 
P. 195. 
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rich; socially and economically useless corporate law and significant 
claims of individuals. 
Forer invites discussion of her proposed reforms (p. 217). In re-
sponse to that invitation, one must question the appropriateness of al-
lowing trial judges the discretion to decide what are significant cases, 
and to impose costs based on the merits of claims and defenses. And 
what would be the effects of deciding legal issues without the benefit of 
facts and of "settling" legal principles once -and for all on those attri-
butes of the common law which Forer so rigorously defends, namely 
its flexibility, its vitality, and its paramount concern for the individ-
ual?4 Fip.ally, the author's notion of due process as essentially a prin-
ciple of fairness is questionable. Can courts create an enclave of 
fairness, which reflects no differences in resources, education, and 
power, when the rest of society is in large part built upon such 
differences? 
4. In criticizing the use of sociological studies as bases for legal opinions, the author states 
that "a legal system predicated upon the rights of the individual cannot operate on the basis of 
averages and norms. It must treat each litigant and each case individually." P. 189. 
Of the common law, Farer notes that "[c]ourts in the United States fulfill another very im-
portant but often ignored function: the development and modernization of the law ...• Ameri-
can judges have a long tradition of interpreting law in the light of changed needs and conditions. 
Good judges must continually be pouring new wine in old bottles." P. 40. 
